Mitigating Technology Abuse in Intimate Partner Violence

CONVERSATION

As our lives becomes increasingly reliant on digital technologies such as smartphones, email, and social media, the threat of their being used against us looms large. In this talk, Thomas Ristenpart will discuss a context where weaponization of technology against people is tragically routine: intimate partner violence (IPV).

Ristenpart is part of a research group that has studied the role technology plays in IPV situations. Via interviews with survivors and support professionals, online measurement studies, andinvestigation of malicious software tools purpose-built for abuse, they have documented how abusers exploit technology to control, harass, stalk, and otherwise harm their current or former partner. To help survivors, they work with technology companies and lawmakers to affect positive changes and, more directly, have put into practice a new interventional approach that they call clinical computer security. TheirClinic to End Tech Abuse works in partnership with the New York City Mayor's Office to End Domestic and Gender-Based Violence to help survivors navigate technology abuse and, ultimately, empower their use of technology.This talk will cover joint work with a large number of collaborators and clinic volunteers.

ABOUT THOMAS RISTENPART

Thomas Ristenpart is an Associate Professor at Cornell Tech and in the Computer Science Department at Cornell University. Before joining Cornell Tech in May 2015, he spent four years as an Assistant Professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. His research spans a wide range of computer security topics, with a recent focus on cloud computing security, as well as topics in applied and theoretical cryptography. His work has been featured in numerous publications including the New York Times, The MIT Technology Review, ABC News, and U.S. News and World Report. He completed his Ph.D. at UC San Diego in 2010.His awards include the UC San Diego Computer Science and Engineering Department Dissertation Award, an NSF CAREER Award, the Best Paper Award at USENIX Security 2014, and a Sloan Research Fellowship.